**Theory of Knowledge Text Notes 2019**

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**Gettier Paper—Is Justified Belief Knowledge?**

Case I

(i) S and J applied for a job and S has evidence for (ii) J will get the job and J has ten dollars in his pocket. From (ii) S infers (iii) ‘who gets the job has ten dollars in his pocket’. In the end, S gets the job and unknown to S S has ten dollars in his pocket. (iii) is true, believed and justified but not knowledge since S does not know how many coins are in his pocket (1963, 121-2).

Case II.

(i). Smith has strong evidence that Jones owns a ford. (ii) Smith does not know where Brown is and Smith constructed: Either Jones has a ford or Brown is in Boston. (iii) Jones, in reality does not have a ford and Brown is Boston. S believes (ii) based on (i) and does not know (iii). (ii) is true due to (iii) not (i). S does not know (iii), thus does not know even if S has justified, true belief about (ii)

\*there is no absolute justification for p, even if S has a good reason for believing p, S cannot be 100% sure. Does S really have a justification in these cases? Case I and II are based on justification inferred from falsehoods.

**Hazleti—The Maturation of The Gettier Problem**

Initial Gettier problem: justification is insufficient for securing knowledge. How to make knowledge secure?

There are three types of Gettier cases:

1. Infers a true conclusion from false premise believed with justification. The cases from the paper are of this type.
2. One believes a true proposition, and is justified in believing so, but the belief is caused by something else than the truth of it. Chisholm’s sheep case is of this type.
3. One believes a true proposition and is justified in believing it, but in an unusual circumstance make it so that it believed it just because of luck. Ginet’s fake barn is of this type.

Attempts to solve the Gettier problem:

Clark—knowledge cannot be derived from false premise,

Paxson—knowledge requires **indefeasible justification**.

Goldman—truth must be the cause of the known proposition.

Dretske—knowledge requires the elimination of relevant alternatives.

Williamson—knowledge requires sensitivity (that you would not believe that p, were it not true that p) or safety (that you would not easily believe falsely that p).

Externalist theories flourished during this period, these theories allow for necessary conditions for knowledge (with the exception of truth) which are not known by the knower.

Different approaches to the Gettier problem:

1. Focused on finding the source and solution to it.

Zagzebski argues that it is partially unsolvable. A response to this is Williamsons “Knowledge first epistemology” (renouncing at the tripartite structure). Some argue that luck is central to the nature of knowledge—see Zagzebski double luck (also see Pritchard). Some argue that there is a previous undetected complexity of the nature of knowledge. However, Pritchard and Williamson reject this stating that the Gettier problem is caused by innocuous assumptions about knowledge.

1. Focused on meta-philosophical intuitions.

The rejection of the tripartite theory of knowledge is based on the Gettier intuition. Experimental philosophers argue that philosophical intuitions are unreliable. Some argue that the Gettier intuition is more prevalent in non-Asian men (Knob). Williamson argues against this approach stating that Gettier’s conclusion is based on argument, not intuition.

1. Virtue epistemology. For X to be knowledge it needs to manifest the intellectual virtue of S. This rules out Gettier cases, since X is true, believed and justified but not because of the intellectual virtues of S (Sosa).

The new Gettier problem:

It is no longer obvious that in a Gettier case S does not have knowledge, this is the question.

**How Mental States Believe—Daniel T. Guilbert**

1. Comprehension includes acceptance, Spinoza system. In Descartes: comprehension is passive; and assessment, acceptance or rejection, is an active process. The article argues that Spinoza is right.
2. Descartes opinion is used in science but is inaccurate to describe human behavior.
3. In Spinoza system, after acceptance and comprehension comes rejection.
4. The two systems, Descartes and Spinoza, are not about how mental representation works but how tagging works. Once the truth value of a proposition is established, it is tagged for retaining this truth value in the future.
5. Spinoza: acceptance and comprehension🡪rejection/keeping it as accepted.

Descartes: comprehension🡪acceptance or rejection.

If the systems have full energy they lead to the same results.

If the systems do not have energy, then they lead to different results. In the Cartesian system lack of energy leads to mere comprehension. In Spinoza, it leads

to acceptance and comprehension. (the mind is a modular system)

1. Point pro-Spinoza: doubt comes latter, credulity comes first as a natural reaction when the mind is not developed (**the ability to deny propositions only comes later** in childhood/children do not learn to accept and reject at the same time, firstly they accept, they are especially gullible). Also, if Descartes was true than in youth many people would have many not accessed beliefs, not many beliefs believed.
2. Research shows that people in stressful situations, lack of sleep, tend to believe anything they are told, instead of just comprehend (**persuasive propositions**). People also tend to believe that if S states “God is great” it means that S believes it even when it is unlikely that S believes it (**autobiographical propositions**). Thus, Spinoza is true.
3. How do people comprehend sentences?

Complexity of thought is seen in complexity of expression. A **marked word** is more complex than un unmarked word (How unhappy S is? Happy is marked and is not neutral, it implies that S is unhappy). This is so since marked words 1. tend to have more letters 2. cannot be used neutrally. The words describing unacceptance are marked, thus more complex.

Verification of proposition. Sentence verification=how people decide if a sentence characterizes its referent. People tend to consider p true. People verify better true affirmative sentences.

**Self-assessing proposition:** **Denial is considered to be affirmative sentences which are afterwards denied**. Before negating the content of a sentence, it first needs to be affirmed. A Spinozan listener would sometimes believe this negation to be true, when it would have no processing power for negating the affirmation. The text speaks about an experiment which proves this.

1. The Spinoza claim is made of two parts: asymmetry hypothesis—acceptance comes before rejection, unity hypothesis—comprehension and acceptance are one and the same thing.
2. **Cartozan system**: comprehension🡪acceptance🡪rejection. Is one able just to comprehend without accepting? The finding until this point support both hypotheses, the Spinozan and this one, the Cartozan.
3. If Spinoza is right, then people **cannot comprehend without accepting. Thus, even if people are informed that a sentence is wrong beforehand, they will still tend to accept it.** Some experiments show that this is the case.

**Peer Disagreement—J. Everett**

Suspending beliefs in peer disagreement cases is about 1. and 2.

2. in philosophy 1. in medicine.

1.Principle of probability: for practical action, no time to verify if p is also true (also testimony)

2.Principle of autonomy: for intellectual inquiry, even the most probable can be false. (no testimony).

Reasons for principle of autonomy in philosophy: they need to defend a thesis they believe in, they need to speak in public spaces, there are better able to defend their own theories, only through autonomy S can continue beyond failure and do something.

Autonomy helps with creative thinking, but creative thinking could be without autonomy if S creates theories S considers false for fun.

For options for which is the best: probability (p) or autonomy (a).

P inside, an outside—pro p.

Just a, philosophy is not practical—pro a.

Depends on context—none of them

Both of them since autonomy creates more probability—both.

None of the options are satisfiable (282).

It is probability as perception and autonomy as opinion. A belief is both perception and opinion, it depends the context. S individually has opinions but, in a collectivity, perceives his belief as probably wrong as any other. In both a and b S needs to believe that it is at least 1% possible for p to be true. The risk of this theory is that S believes at the same time p and non p under two different aspects.

**Elusive Knowledge—David Lewis**

The problem: knowledge is fallible, or it is not knowledge at all if we accept the skeptical possibility. The text argues that knowledge is infallible even if we accept the skeptical possibility. This is so since knowledge is contextual—in epistemology we do not know p but in everyday life we know p (550-1).

Infallibilism proposed by text: S knows p iff p holds in every possibility left uneliminated by S’s evidence=if S’s evidence eliminate every possibility in which non p. (+the cases which we consciously ignore due to context. In the context of everyday life, we ignore skepticism. In epistemology, no). Infallible: **S knows p iff p in all worlds uneliminated by evidence and which are not contextually ignored (out of the domain) (551).**

Rules for establishing what can we ignore or not:

Actuality—p from actuality of subject cannot be ignored

Belief—possibility that the subject believes to obtain (or ought to) cannot be ignored.

Resemblance—If possibility X is similar to Y, X cannot be ignored🡪Y cannot be ignored.

Reliability—possibilities from reliable sources cannot be ignored.

Method—ignore that tested p might not be representative sample.

Conservatism—the possibilities people generally ignore can be ignored. (559)

Attention—only the possibilities proper to the context cannot be ignored. (To eliminate skepticism in epistemology it needs to be stated that possibilities we could have ignored remain ignored even if the skeptic draws our attention to them) (In the context of epistemology, skeptical world which were normally ignored are not ignored🡪S loses knowledge).

When we asses (as detectives) S’s knowledge of p, the context is defined by us, not by S.

(562) P can be eliminated but not ignored, can be ignored but not eliminated, eliminated or ignored. Against skepticism by showing that closer works just in the same context.

**Elusive Knowledge details**

Knowledge as context dependent not due to justification, the author eliminates justification.

infallibility definition=S knows p iff S’s evidence eliminates every possibility in which non-P.

**P=proposition**=there is one necessary proposition (equivalent) which holds in all possibilities uneliminated by S’s evidence (no matter who S and the evidence are). (551-2)

**Possibility**=X is one possibility iff it cannot be divided in subclasses with different truth values of P or a subclass eliminated by evidence and others not. All sub classes need to state the same. (de se et nunc propositions specify that they apply only to particular S or/and at a particular time) We cannot limit ourselves just to prop according to laws of nature or history, these are contingent and could be different. (552)

**Non-eliminated possibilities** are those which are given by S’s experience and memory. If world conflicts with Experience of S, then it is eliminated. (553)

**Every (domain).** All possible worlds uneliminated with the exception of those out of the domain (ignored). (553-4)

**Rules for establishing what we cannot we ignore.**

Actuality—actuality of S not of one inquiring if S knows p (if S is in a different world).

Belief—there can be exceptions to the rule of belief. A belief has degrees and a certain amount of belief or ought to belief need to be obtained for the rule to enter into play. If S believes P or ought to believe P given the context P cannot be ignored (if P is relevant for S).

Resemblance—557—If W resembles actuality (e.g. by that P is not eliminated in W), then W cannot be ignored (this is not meant to apply for the resemblance between skepticism and normality). The resemblance rule solves the Gettier problems (557)—in G. cases you cannot ignore alternative luck case in which non-P.

Attention—559—S can ignore also possibilities which S could have ignored.

**Rule for what we can ignore**

Reliability—558—Can be ruled out by Actuality or/and resemblance as in some G. cases.

Methodism—558—ignore that tested p might not be representative sample.

When we asses S’s knowledge as epistemologists we cannot ignore S’s skeptical hypothesis (we cannot ignore more possibilities than S does 561). It seems that in epistemology knowledge is one just by presupposition, by ignoring. Knowledge just by presupposition is elusive knowledge, S cannot claim knowledge by it (S can easily loose it) (561).

**Against denying closer:**

Dretske against closer: P->Q (is P but not Q). However: this happens when the context of knows is changed during the argument (564)

Saul Kripke problem: P implies that (since closer) any world against P is misleading🡪we should ignore all evidence against that we are wrong. Absurd conclusion (we should revise beliefs). Solution: context was changed during inquiry. Initially non-P was ignored, but brought under rule of attention it could not be ignored. (564-5)

Compartmentalized thinkers’ example (state that S knows p if at least one compartment knows p) does not disactivate closer since each compartment can be considered as a different.

Closer remains but its truth values differ on context. (565)

Problem, doing meta-epistemology itself means creating the context for skepticism (566).

**Perceptual Knowledge—William Alston**

What is *indented* is supplementary, not necessary to read. In **Bold** section titles. Underlined crucial information inside a section.

**Justification as absolute. Prima facie justification. Justifications about what is putatively perceived**=**There is a tree** **(Not I see that there is a tree. The perception itself, not that one is perceiving x).** **This text does not deal with the radical skeptical question***. [Against coherentism. Externalists—conditions for knowledge in general (a priori arguments e.g. Wittgenstein. A posteriori argument: 226-7) Internalists—conditions for knowledge which can be given by the perceivers]*

**Naïve direct realism**—**the visual experience justifies the perceptual belief. The right answer, but in a crude form (227). A) Perceptual belief justified by experience B) Perceptual belief justified by S’s knowledge of having such an experience (Author states A not B).** *[(The author ignores Doxaic factors, non-perceptual factors which make perceptual belief justified 228). The author has an internalist approach (231) since insight for justification is necessary. (230—Dretske counter-factuals—externalist) (Against Davidson’s argument: some causes are justifications 231-2)]*

**Alternatives for the nature of perceptual experience**—direct realism; indirect realism (the sense-datum theory—act-object relation but object is mental, the adverbial theory—not about objects, just a way of being conscious, phenomenal quality view—act-object relation but objects are qualities of mental states 233). Direct realism is the best for internalist justification—P is justified in Q because perception directly links perception to Q (234).

**Candidates for each alternative:** Sense datum—Moore, Russel. Adverbial—Chisholm. Phenomenalists—Lewis, Russel. Realists (Moore) Idealists (Russel, Lewis—empirical P is just a construct of S’s experience whenever stimulus P).

**Solutions given by these candidates and they are not tenable:**

1.**cop out**— Price, Moore, Chisholm—perceptual beliefs are self-warranted (not explained how experience justifies belief). Self-warrants for beliefs: a priori; being simple—235-6. 2.**Phenomenalists cannot reduce descriptions of objects just to pure experience**, they need to include physical statements in the antecedent (236).

3.**Divorcing justification from truth-conductivity** (X is a priori justified even if S does not know if S is likely true) (Wittgenstein’s idea that concepts have criteria of their correct application)—Argument against this divorce: If justification is divorced from truth, why should we care for justification? (237)

**In conclusion:** direct realism is best.

**Obstacles towards conclusion:** a)New physics🡪secondary qualities banished from physical world. b) Illusions (237-8). **Solutions for restating conclusion, about b)**: in a more i) internalist or ii) externalist fashion. i)description (240)—Intuitively describing experience as X is enough to justify that experience, ii) the experience. (239)—The experience justifies the belief no matter of it is hallucinatory or not.

**Philosophical Expertise and The Burden of Proof—Williamson**

1.‘Experimental’ philosophers declare that the expertise of philosophers is not trustworthy in the case of thought experiments. ‘Experimental’ philosophers have showed that non-philosophers give different responses to thought experiments than philosophers. **Williamson criticizes ‘experimental’ philosophers since he states that philosophers are as reliable in thought experiments as anywhere in philosophy (Arguments for expertise defense: not opinion of lay people).**

2. In ‘‘Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?’’ (WGBA) object to the expertise defense (that experimental philosophers are wrong since the surveys they’ve done are on lay people) by stating that philosophers need to empirically prove that they are better at making thought experiments. Williamsons response to them stating that instead experimental philosophers are the ones which need to prove their position—It is reasonable to consider philosophers more entitled in thought experiments than lay people.

3. The (WGBA) do not specify why thought experiments are based on intuition and not argument. (They do not properly define what an intuition is).

4. Common assumptions about experiments: a. humans can perform only a tiny fraction of all the feasible experiments, b. well tested T entails untested O, S should believe O based on T. Discarding T because it leads to O is a dangerous form of skepticism (not entailing to O is what experimental philosophers do🡪they should keep believing in O, expertise defense)

5.It is obvious that having expertise in P makes S judge better P cases, it is assumed by academics in other disciplines (the expert knows). Expertise trains cognitive capacities: a.it is common experience, b. for testing cognitive capacities of S an Y which already has cognitive capacities is necessary. If the cognitive capacities of Y would need to be proved by Z, it would go ad infinitum. The burden of proof is on experimental philosophers since: a. thought experiments are part of the expertise of philosophers, b. is normal to assume that philosophers have more expertise even if this was not tested.

6. (WGBA) cannot state that lack of philosophical progress proofs the non-expertise of philosophers since they assume (without experiments) that philosophers have expertise, it is only thought experiments which they doubt. (WGBA) need to specify how thought experiments are different from other philosophical tasks: thought experiments overlaps with normal phil. skills such as “close analysis of text”, “argumentation”. (WGBA) accuse phil. of based on a general appeal to expertise (being expert in X means being one in Y), but this is not what Williamson meant.

7. Traits of general expertise: (a) repetitive practice with accurate feedback; (b) decomposition of the task into sub-tasks; (c) use of external decision aids. (i) (WGBA) argue that ‘thought experiments’ lack (a). (WGBA) fail to proof (i) since they do not use the proper comparisons to assess the lack or not of feedback in thought experiments (the comparison between phil. undergrad and professor and chess player and grandmaster is not as relevant as the comparison between feedback in thought experiments and feedback in other philosophical areas; they fail to distinguish between feedback for trainee and feedback for trained philosophers). (b) is easy, to cut thought experiments in parts, (c) thought experiments do not have so much (c) but have outcome tables and visual display of the structure of the thought experiment. (WGBA)’s traits of general expertise undermines their hypothesis about thought experiments.

8. (WGBA)’s objections to Williamson’s points about (a) and (c). About (a): (1) phil. cannot determine from the armchair how much feedback creates expertise and (2) infinite regress of who certifies the expertise of the feedback on thought experiments, no basis (expert intuitor I is based on II and II on III). Objection to (1): this would also apply to other skills of philosophers, not only to thought experiments. (since other skills do not need empirical feedback verification, so does thought experiments). Objection to (2): thought experiments can be decomposed in sub-tasks/ even If they could not one could still give feedback by comparing with other thought experiments. S can evolve to a higher level through common criticism without necessary learning from one already at a higher level (S gains skills from expert, but the regress is not vicious).

9. (WGBA) criticize philosophers that the hypothesis that phil. do better at thought experiments is based on how well they perform on subtle points, ignoring the fact that lay people have different intuitions. Williamson objects by stating that “explaining the effectiveness of the education need not involve explaining the specific patterns of variation amongst the uneducated”.

10. (227) about orthodoxy.

Summary:

“The dialectical situation is this. The experimental critique presents evidence that philosophically untrained subjects perform poorly at thought experimentation, a cognitive task characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy. In general, given a cognitive task characteristic of a discipline, it is unwarranted to project data about the performance at the task of subjects untrained in the discipline onto subjects trained in the discipline, without specific evidence that training in the discipline makes no substantial difference to skill at that task. WGBA’s attempt to provide such specific evidence consists of a few vague and casual claims about training in philosophy and thought experimentation. They provide no significant evidence that thought experimentation is worse off in the relevant respects than the cognitive skills they acknowledge to be enhanced by training in philosophy, such as informal argumentation and the close analysis of texts. Consequently, they provide no reason to rely less on trained philosophers’ skill at thought experimentation than on their skill at those other cognitive tasks (226)”.

**Bullshit—Harry G Frankfurt**

Aim: systematic definition of bullshit

Sources: 1. Oxford Dictionary; 2. Max Black’s theory of Hamburg.

2.Max Black: a. deceptive misrepresentation, b. short of lying, c. with the intention to deceive about S’s thoughts and deeds.

a.it is an intention to conceal x.

b.it is similar to lying, on the same axis, but different from it.

c.it is more focused on deceiving about one’s beliefs, personality than about the factive content. Lying is also indirectly deceiving S about one’s beliefs.

On the right track but incomplete.

1.Oxford Dictionary: bull sessions=sessions in which everybody suspends the truth condition of what they say. Bull=hot air=lack of content. Bull=bluff=more similar to fakery, it is not about the truth value of what is said, but of the intention with which it is said🡪disinterest in truth. Deceiving S that one is interested in truth.

—Wittgenstein’s story illustrates this trait

Traits of bullshit:

—creative, free to reinvent the context

—laxity, not carefully crafted as a lie, a lie is concerned with a particular falsity.

—deceive S one is interested in truth.

—easier to escape from bullshit than lie

Why is bullshit more dangerous than lie?

Outside of the game of truth-false. A liar will remember to state the truth when needed, a bullshiter might lose this habit. Bullshit=post-truth=more dangerous to the truth. Why so much bullshit? Not knowing what you say/Skeptical anti-realism (no truth, replace it with sincerity, does not work since one does not simply know what one is)

**The Cognitivity of Religious Language—**

—1.meaning🡪2.truth-apt. Arguments against proof of religion deny 1or 2.

Verificationism denies 1. since religion is not empirical. However: the criterion of verifiability is contradictory with its own standard, makes universalizability and falsifiability meaningless, too much to revise. Partial verificationism: only partial non metaphysical. However, metaphysical statements can cripple in conjunctions. Verificationism not as a criterion, but as a guideline: (however) a self-contradictory guideline has no value, a guideline has no imperative force.

Verificationism about religion: religion does not seek to prove itself (it does not respect Poppers falsifiability principle). Religion confronts with plausible counter arguments to it and seeks proofs and they think they already have the proofs. Religious people to not change their belief in face of contrary evidence since God is at the center of the web of belief (faith).

Expressive interpretation of religious language denies 2. stating that religion is not about truth but expressing one’s moral code. However, I believe the moral code because God is real does not mean I believe the moral code because I believe the moral code. Also, religious statements are used by religious people with empirical intent.

Religious language sui generis denies 2. by stating that religion has a different language game (truth and false without being so due to empirical content). Why would religion need to be a different game? It is still based on arguments. As a different language game, it would be unable to convince others of their claims.

**Ernest Sosa—Knowing Fully Well**

1. Belief is a kind of performance. The epistemic normativity of X is a performance normativity. The problem with this is that the suspension of belief requires the same epistemic normativity as belief.

Kind of success of a belief: it is true, it is competent, it is true because of the believers competence (apt). S throws an arrow with great competence; the wind diverges the arrow from the right track and puts it back on it. It is true, it is competent, but the competence of S is not the reason for which the arrow successfully hits the target. In a Gettier case: it is true, it is competent, but it is not true because of the believer’s competence.

1. What is the epistemic normativity of knowledge? What are the conditions a belief needs to obtain for being knowledge? What is the condition beyond justification which a belief must have? What is the value of knowledge? Is knowledge more valuable then mere right belief?
2. the competence of the believer in attaining truth. This explains why knowledge is better than mere true belief. (A mere true belief does not show the competence of the believer). Knowledge as performance explains Gettier cases and value of knowledge—aim of paper to defend knowledge as performance.
3. The problem with knowledge as an apt performance is that withholding belief has epistemic normative value but is not a performance. This doubts that we have found the principle to judge epistemic normativity. The normative epistemic value of withholding belief is that it is better to withhold belief than assert it when having no information.
4. Withholding belief, not acting, is a type of performance with a purpose, not failing. One is good at withholding if it prevents failure and by preventing failure it does not prevent success. (archery vs. hunter analogy. The hunter needs to asses, forbear or not, if he shoots).
5. Meta-apt and apt. Withholding is not apt, it is only meta-apt, is not an activity, it is choosing if to perform an activity. Apt refers at being able to perform the first-order skill (aiming at believing true). Meta-apt refers to being able to asses correctly this first-order skill, It is shooting (aiming if to believing at all) appropriate in this context.
6. A performance is more apt if it is both apt and meta-apt. Humans, unlike animals can be both apt and meta-apt. The meta-apt ability of knowledge is to know if to hold or withhold a belief. Knowing by luck is worse than apt knowledge, apt knowledge is worse than apt and meta-apt knowledge (Meta-apt increases the chances of S to be apt). (meta-apt and apt are independent from each other. X can be apt without being meta-apt, X can be meta-apt without being apt)
7. apt, meta-apt, fully apt (apt because meta-apt)

**Other subtle points:**

 —X can be apt and meta-apt but not be apt since is meta-apt. Diana chooses to shoot by tossing a coin.

 —Withholding means not performing x. Withholding since S is asleep is not done with an aim. Withholding beliefs is done with an aim, avoiding failure. Withholding beliefs is a performance of S ‘not to perform believing x’ .

 —inanimate objects can perform and have an aim, but they do not perform because of the aim.

**Hazleti—The Myth of Factive Verbs**

Approaches to understanding ‘knowledge’—intuitions about knowledge,—intuitions about language (about the meaning of the word knows). There are many different approaches to knowledge, is *there the approach to knowledge*?

Epistemologists use ‘know’ in a different sense than in ordinary talk—in epistemology it is factive (falsity cannot be known). Epistemologists cannot base their view on ordinary talk since ‘know’ is not factive then. **Analysing epistemologically ‘known’ based on linguistic analysis should not happen.** ‘Known’ as linguistically factive is a myth. For deriving epistemic factivity philosophers need to use something else than linguistic factivity.

1. Examples of utterances against factivity
2. Criticise three arguments for factivity (These arguments explain the appeal of factivity)
3. Defend that the non-factive concept of ‘knows’ in ordinary talk is the most effective. III.1 explains the non-factive concept of ‘knows’ proposed by Hazleti, iii.2 traditional theory of language attributions, iii.3 discuss an alternative to both iii.1 and iii.2.

I. (1) Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers, before two Australian doctors in the early 80s proved that ulcers are actually caused by bacterial infection.

(2)  He figures anything big enough to sink the ship they’re going to see in time to turn. But the ship’s too big, with too small a rudder ... it can’t corner worth shit. Everything he knows is wrong.

(3)  In school we learned that World War I was a war to ‘‘make the world safe for democracy,’’ when it was really a war to make the world safe for the Western imperial powers.

(4)  I had trouble breathing, sharp pains in my side, several broken ribs and a partially collapsed lung, and I was in the middle of nowhere without any real rescue assets—it was then that I realized I was going to die out there.

Objection 1: loose talk (501-2)

Reply: if loose talk means X is ‘literally true’ but not ‘strictly true’ then the threat of factivity is not eliminated. Loose talk does not mean approximating the truth.

Objection 2: non-factive linguistic knows promotes relativism

Reply: If ‘know’ is non-factive then relativity about knowledge does not necessarily mean relativity about truth. More types of knowledge can coexist without relativity about truth🡪non-factivity leads to less relativity instead of more.

Objection 3: ‘know’ is polysemous, can be both factive and non-factive.

Reply: Before considering in III.3 (518). If it is polysemous, polysemous understanding of ‘know’ is a vice, a univocal understanding of ‘know’.

Objection 4: (1)-(4) are false but pragmatically appropriate, metaphorical projection.

Reply: this will be replied in iii.2 (where in 2).

II. Argument 1 for factivity: syntactic (504-506)

 Argument 2 for factivity: “S knows p, but not p” seems contradictory.

 Argument 3: nothing falsity can be knows. (506)

Common sense intuition does not prove Factivity. In Meno the epistemic factivity of ‘know’ is defended, this understanding of knowledge is incompatible with common sense (504).

Argument 1: ‘know’ is part of the linguistic class named syntactically factive—has syntactical features in common:

a. syntactically factive can always be followed by “the fact that…”

(5) I remember the fact that I opened the door.

 (6) \* I believe the fact that I opened the door.

b. Second, syntactically factive expressions are always able to be followed by gerunds, whereas others are not. Compare:

(7) I remember having opened the door.

(8) \* I believe having opened the door. (\*not syntactically factive)

c. Third, syntactically factive expressions, by contrast with others, cannot be followed by infinitives. Compare:

(9) \* I realize Martin to have opened the door. (10) I believe Martin to have opened the door.

All syntactically factive expressions are considered semantically factive.

Reply 1: that x is syntactical features in common is not a good reason to state that it has semantical features in common. (maybe is a reason to consider some semantic features in common). Reply 2: the verbs on our list are not syntactically factive. They do not meet all three criteria:

(11) \* I know the fact that I opened the door.

(12) \* I learned the fact that I opened the door.

(13) \* I realize the fact that I opened the door.

(14) \*I know having opened the door.
(15) \*I learned having opened the door.
(16) \*I realized having opened the door.
(17) I know Martin to have opened the door.
(18)I remember Martin to have opened the door.

Argument 2: ‘I know p, but not p’ is contradictory🡪’know’ is factive (506)

Reply: ‘I know p, but not p’ is not contradictory, is Moore paradoxically. ‘I know p, but not p’ is improper but not contradictory. Is improper since it is pragmatically implies that ‘I know p means that p’, however, in some cases such sentences are appropriate. ‘I learned p, but not p’ is found by many as contradictory.

Argument 3: nothing falsity can be known. S knows p only if S’s belief that p couldn’t be wrong (false). Reply: Hazleti rejects infallibility for the familiar anti-skeptical reasons (against closure). It is attractive to consider that there is a relationship between ‘infallibility’ and the ‘truth-condition’. The ‘truth condition of know’ is ‘infallibility’ are both false.

III. Different theories of linguistic ‘knows’ will be addressed, by comparing them it will be showed that non-factive ‘knows’ is the winner. These theories are characterized in terms of their semantic attributions. These theories will be assessed depending on the quality of the pragmatic explanations they give to prima facia counterexamples to them. (508)

**Non factive concept of knowledge—S knows p even if p is false:**

(NF1) An utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if S believes p. (NF2) An utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if S possesses epistemic warrant for (her belief that) p.

Epistemic warrant here is externalist, internalist implies that p is true.

Conditions for epistemic warrant: (Proper Source Warrant) S’s belief that p is epistemically warranted if S’s belief that p was formed in a reliable way.

(Success Warrant) S’s belief that p is warranted if S’s belief that p is true

**Traditional concept of knowledge**

(T1) An utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if S believes p.

(T2) An utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if p is true.
(T3) An utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only S’s belief that p is epistemically justified.

**Non-doxastic theory**

Finding knowledge implies finding a reliable source of knowledge, but not always finding an S with true belief about p. So, ‘S knows that p’ even if ‘S doesn’t believe that p’.

(ND1)  An utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if p is true.

(ND2)  An utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if S is a reliable source of information about p, in virtue of there existing an ‘‘information-chain which starts somewhere near the facts themselves’’ and terminates with S’s reliability vis-a` -vis p.

Which of the theories best explains (I-VI)? These cases imply different uses of ‘know’. These theories should give a semantics of ‘know’ which explains this:

1. We use ‘knows’ to relay testimony. If A and B are police, investigating a recent bombing, for example: A: Any information from the FBI about how the bomb was constructed? B: They know the bomb was homemade.
2. We use ‘knows’ to describe the beliefs of a third party, while presupposing the truth of the proposition in question. If A and B are prosecutors, for example: A: What’s relevant is whether the defendant willingly com- mitted a crime. B: Well, she knew that what she was doing was a crime.
3. We use ‘knows’ to guarantee the truth of some proposition. If A and B are inspecting a specimen, for example: A: Can we be sure that this one is of the genus Calcinus? B: I know that this is a specimen of Calcinus hazletti.
4. We use ‘knows’ to describe someone’s warranted convictions, without suggesting that they are true, as in (1) and (2), above.
5. We use ‘knows’ to indicate possessors of information who don’t believe. If A and B are figuring out why the door at the supermarket automatically opens when they walk nearby, for example: A: How come it opens only when someone needs to go through? B: It has a sensor, which knows when someone’s coming.
6. We use ‘knows’ to concede the reasonableness of believing something. If B is resistant to the romantic avowals of A, but A makes a compelling case that his heart is in the right place, for example: B: I know you love me, but I just don’t believe it.

III.1 **Non factive concept of knowledge** is problematic at explaining I-III, which seem to imply that ‘S knows p’ is factive. However, this is not the case since: a. I-III could be replaced with non-factive expressions and the implication remain, b. Grice’s Quality and Quantity implicatures shows that ‘S knows p’ pragmatically entails p but ‘S knows p’ by itself does mean p. (512-514). In case III Hazleti uses the example of Austin but is the same pragmatic point.

V-VI are problematic with NF1 (515). V—the link between knowledge and belief is kept (If p is false, the door thought somebody is coming), belief is ascribed to the sensor metaphorically VI—S believes p and is an exaggeration or S does not believe p and S’s description of “I know” is a pretense.

III.2 **Traditional concept of knowledge** is problematic at explaining IV—The most promising way to explain IV is by protagonist projection (Hudson). There is a difference between protagonist projections and (1)-(2) (know x causes ulcers even if false/all S knows about ship false). In protagonist projections the utterer would say that he knows that p is not the case. It is not clearly how (1)-(2) would respond. In case (3) the speaker would say that the falsehood was really learned (516) (the falsehood that America wants democracy was learned). Speakers of “He gave her a ring studded with diamonds, but they turned out to be glass” clearly belief that ‘not p’ implies S does not know that p. In case of (1)-(2) is not intuitively true that utterers believe that nothing false can be known. The boundary of the concept of knowledge, as factive or non-factive is not drawn by nature, but by us (argument against Factive theory). Also, charity enjoins us to oppose systematic falsehood in ordinary talk.

III.3 The non-factive theory is the best since it elegantly explains cases in which it seems as if ‘S knows p’ entails p. (518)

Knowledge might polysemous, this is not technically a problem, but is not elegant. If ‘know’ is polysemous, then from a linguistic point of view there is no reason for denying a non-factive use of ‘know’.