**Modern Philosophy Text Notes 2019**

**By Nous Monkey**

**Email:** [**nousmonkey@gmail.com**](mailto:nousmonkey@gmail.com)

**What is modernity?**

Historical period—early-middle 18th century: Galileo, Descartes, Kant-Nietzsche.

Theme of the period: newness of ideas and promoting enlightenment, i.e. reason. In this period medieval scholasticism (causality, religion and philosophy) was discarded and the authority of scripture (and people) was replaced with the authority of reason—Descartes and the myth of modernity: Descartes doubted everything and found that “I think therefor I am” is the only certain facts (from which he derived all the rest) (Descartes rebuild what the scholastic said and based his theory on them). The myth of modernity captures the essence of enlightenment: the authority of reason and newness, doubting the past.

—4 ideas to watch out in the course:

—nature of reason

—history of reason

—What is the thinking subject? (reason and I)

—Renewing philosophy. (doubting the past and reason)

**Kant—What is Enlightenment?—**The theme of modernity: escaping self-incurred immaturity

—contract with the future ruler for respecting enlightenment

—private/public reason, tension between authority/freedom.

—enlightenment as a process/as a period (Scotland, Germany, France)

—Escaping out of self-incurred immaturity (inability to use S’s reason without the guidance of another). This immaturity is self-incurred because it is more convenient to let others give spiritual and medical advice. At the social-political level, guardians profited of this convenience and a) guide people, b) told them that it is dangerous to use their own reason.

—Habit. It is not so dangerous to use one’s own reason (after some fails one can learn) but because S is not accustomed to use S’s reason, it seems really dangerous. (The problem is that S is never let to use S’s reason).

—Collective Enlightenment. It is easier for more people to enlighten than one individual. (A guardian, or any S, needs to spread enlightenment to others) However, this is slow since other S stirred by non-enlightened guardians would discredit the enlightened guardian.

—Public use of reason and private use of reason—the solution, promote public use of reason.

Public use of reason—reason used when S expresses to the general public (free time). Private reason—reason used when not expressing to the general public (at work). It is necessary that S respects rules at work, since is part of the commonwealth, but S in free time can criticise the rules. (The clergyman can respect at the workplace the rules of the church but if he opposes the very essence of religion, then the clergy will feel the need to resign).

—If private use of reason (civil freedom) was not restricted, then public use of reason (intellectual freedom) would be in danger. Knowing that the boss will object to your opinion p when applied to the workplace, S never expresses p. If S knows that p in public use does not affect his workplace, people are free to intellectually think what they want.

—the first step is intellectual freedom, afterwards action will also be free.

—The impossibility to prevent any enlightenment. This goes against the essence of being human, progress in your knowledge. If a generation would try this, another generation would accuse it. An established order is temporarily privately kept (at the workplace), but publicly (in the free time) is criticises until new measures are applied at the workplace. (The criterion for an ought of a legislation, can S will that legislation for himself)

—The role of the monarch. The monarch cannot impose beliefs on others since the legislative authority depends on uniting the collective will of the people in his own. Monarch must: a) let people think freely, b. stop any S which prevents others from thinking freely. An enlightened monarch will let others argue about a lot of rules, including the legislation.

**Kant—On Metaphysics (Critique of Pure reason and Prolegomena)—The beginning of a new philosophy of reason.**

—The battlefield (problem) of metaphysics. Reason by its own nature inquires about empirical P using empirical principle P, inquiring about the origin of empirical P reason needs to ask questions which cannot be answered by using empirical principle P. Since experience cannot verify if non-empirical P is true, only reason can be applied, and reason got contradictory answers about non-empirical P—the battle of metaphysics.

—there is an hidden error in ideas: empiricism vs. dogmatism. (Empiricism=there is nothing in the mind without being in the senses, metaphysical claim).

—Indifferentism cannot be the response. When using wrong methods S becomes indifferent to the inquiry, it is chaos in science, but also the prelude to progress. Indifferentism was caused by the maturity of thinking, not wanting to be deluded by fake knowledge. Reason needs to prevent fake knowledge through self-knowledge (dismiss groundless claims and keep the ground-full ones, based on the unchanging laws of reason)—the tool allowing this is the critique of pure reason.

—The necessity of metaphysics. Reason asks not only about experience, but about the absolute totality of all possible experience, which is non-empirical. For answering this question, ideas (which are about the collective unity of possible experience), not categories (which refers to experience in so far as experience can be given), are to be used.

**—How is metaphysics possible?**

—The mind: sensibility (space/time) (Aesthetic) ) (synthetic a priori)—intuition=objective element.

Understanding (categories, interprets sensibility) (Analytic) (synthetic a priori)

reason (ideas) —thought. (Dialectical)

—intuition + understanding=knowledge.

—Understanding (categories) and Reason (ideas). The understanding needs categories for interpreting experience. Reason needs ideas. If there is an error produced by these ideas, it is unavoidable but it can be prevented from leading us astray. The distinction between ideas and categories is essential for metaphysics, otherwise proper metaphysics is not possible. In the past, philosophers believed that ideas were the same as categories and thus treated them the same and this led to the problems of metaphysics.

—The antinomies. Only reason itself can find errors in the realm of ideas, but this hard since reason is dialectical in its ideas. This dialectical situation is that of the antinomies—time and space infinite/finite ; free will/causality, simple constitution/made out of parts; necessary being/all is contingent.

—Speculative knowledge is possible. Unlike empirical knowledge, reason can always know about its subject because it is about its own activity. Knowing ideas helps at understanding how categories work and put them in harmony—understand the absolute totality of experience (which is necessary for speculative activity). However, one should not believe that cosmological, psychological (immortality of the soul) and theological ideas amount to knowledge.

—The solution, How metaphysics is possible. Metaphysics should not be about answering the antinomies (reason needs to see its limits). Metaphysics should have a critique of reason, display all the a priori concepts, divide them according to sources (sensibility, understanding, reason) and analyse all that can be derived from them, establish the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition, it must establish the boundaries of their use.

**—The possibility of synthetic a priori cognition? (The possibility of metaphysics at the level of understanding)**

—The problem of causality. David Hume attacked the concept of causality as a priori since: a)it cannot be seen both rationally and empirically how ‘since Y is the case P **necessary** is the case’🡪causality is not based on **necessity (objective necessity)** but on habit (subjective necessity) (causality is not about rational necessity, but about being accustomed that Y causes P). If Hume is right, no metaphysics is possible at all—since reason by itself cannot establish relation between ideas. However, Hume is wrong according to Kant since causation can be a priori and not only causation there are more of these concepts (pure concepts of understanding, not found in experience, makes experience possible)

—Hume believes that all thoughts come from the senses, thus if causation is not in the senses it is nowhere.

—Kant’s solution to the Humean problem: is synthetic a priori knowledge possible.

—The 12 concepts are the only 12 logical functions.

—Proving synthetic a priori concepts mean proving the possibility of metaphysics. Analytics=not adding new content, what is in the predicate was included in the subject (based on the principle of non-contradiction). Synthetic=adding new content (the predicate was not already included in the subject). A priori=non empirical. A posteriori=empirical.

Analytic a priori=all bachelors are unmarried man. (analytic a posteriori is impossible)

Synthetic posteriori=birds are blue.

Synthetic a priori=mathematical concepts.

(mathematical judgements seem analytical because they respect the principle of non-contradiction, but this does not mean that their fundamental propositions are derived from the principle. An a priori synthetic proposition can exist if another synthetic proposition is presupposed from which the first is deduced, never however in itself).

—The categories of understanding, the set of synthetic a priori intuitions which establish the source from which all universal laws of nature must be derived. (Understanding makes knowledge of experience possible) (Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality).

—How is pure natural science possible?

—the senses intuit.

—the understanding thinks.

—thinking: uniting representations in a consciousness (subjectively, judgement depends on S. Objective, judgement does not depend on S) (subjective: representations united in one subject alone. Objective: representation united in a consciousness in general)

—uniting representations in a consciousness: judgement

—Concepts are objective: they can be analytic or synthetic, posteriori or a prior.

—Pure concepts of understanding make synthetic a posteriori judgement necessary and universally valid.

—Rules: judgements which are the conditions for unifying representations in a consciousness.

—If a rule represents the unification as necessary, it is an a priori rule.

—The rules which are not derived from other rules are principles.

—the a priori principles of possible experience: those principles which bring appearances under pure concepts of understanding.

Since the principles of possible experience are at the same time universal laws of nature which can be thought a priori, “How is pure natural science possible?” is answered.

—The Humean problem reversed. Even if we do not have insight through reason to the possibility of causality, it has been showed to be a priori. Also, understanding can be applied only to experience (not ideas) understanding (this is so since causation can be only about appearances, not things in themselves). Experience is derived from understanding.

—p is related to y—relation between appearances.

—If p then y—hypothetical judgement

—P causes y-since ‘If p then y’ is a proposition of experience, then it must be universally valid.

Transcendental aesthetics

—intuition is the means through which a cognition relates directly to objects.

—Intuition takes place if the object is given to us, but to ‘be given to us’ is possible only if the mind is affected in a certain way.

—"The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility” (A19/B33).

—Objects are given to us through sensibility (which gives us intuitions), they are thought through understanding, and from it arises concepts.

—All thoughts need to be directly or indirectly related to sensibility since objects can be given to us only though experience.

— The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is **sensation**. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called **empirical**. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called **appearance**.

—The appearance corresponding to sensation (matter). The a priori basis of ordering appearances is (form). There are two types of forms (of sensible intuition): space and time.

**Kant—Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral**

Introduction in Kantian Ethics—non empirical.

Types of cognition: material (concerned with an object) or formal (the form of understanding and reasoning in general, not with an object).

Formal philosophy is logic.

Material philosophy is concerned with objects and their laws, there can be two types of laws: laws of nature (physics/doctrine of nature) and laws of freedom (ethics/doctrine of morals).

Each material philosophy has a formal and a material aspect. Kant is concerned with the formal aspect of ethics.

Moral law—moral rule which has necessity, not empirical at all. There exists non-empirical morality, not based on anthropology, is clear from the common idea of duty and moral laws. Moral laws apply to all rational agents, not only humans.

Practical rule—empirical rule of conduct. Even if it is unverbalizable in an aspect, it is not a moral law. All moral philosophy is based on its non-empirical, pure, part.

Even if morality is non-empirical, S still needs to look at experience to see: a)when the moral laws are applicable b)how S to make S respect the moral laws in practice (against inclinations)

—Kant searches for one principle to solve all problems in society.

—Section 1-2, search for the principle, section 3: establish the supreme principle.

—starts with the opinion of normal people and then searches for supreme principle.

Section II: Transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals.

—Definition of a Will

—Rational beings: have a will=are able to act in accordance with representations of laws.

—Reason is necessary for the derivation of actions from laws🡪will is practical reason.

—Types of Wills

—If reason always determine the will=what is objectively necessary becomes subjectively necessary

—If reason not always determines the will (if will is not in itself in conformity with reason)=what is objectively necessary becomes subjectively contingent (due to desire). The determination of such a will according to reason=necessitation.

—The representation of an objective principle which is necessitated by a will is a command, and the formula of a command an imperative. Ought=necessitation

—practical good=x which determines the will by means of representations of reason, by objective causes valid for all rational beings.

—agreeable=x which influences the will by means of feelings (subjective-individual).

—a perfectly good will=act based on moral laws but not through necessitation (God)

—The categorical Imperative.

—All imperatives are a) hypothetical or b)categorical: a)the practical necessity of a possible action as a means of achieving something else that one wills (empirical-not univ, based on interest🡪desire, not reason), b)an action is objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end. (a) good for something else (b) good in itself (will determined by reason)

—The categorical imperative (practical law)=it has not to do with action and its result, but the principle from which the action is done. The categorical imperative is not found empirically. It is an a priori synthetic practical proposition.

—The categorical imperative, unlike a hypothetical imperative, contains in its ‘concept’ the content. (For an hypothetical, the condition needs to be given for knowing its content). The categorical imperative is not about conforming to a specific law, but with the universality of a law as such (demands lawfulness in general). (has no specific content, structure, it does not tell you what to do)

—The categorical imperative: *act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.*

—The categorical imperative can also be expressed as such (universality of a law as a cause is generally named nature): *act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a* **universal law of nature**.

—the categorical imperative: can x be coherently willed to be universal law (for anybody). E.g. murder: It would lead to lack of people which murder.

—The concept of freedom is the key to the explanation of the autonomy of the will.

—Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and *freedom* would be the property of such a causality that it can be efficient independently of external causes *determining* it.

—Even if will, as a causality, is not based on laws of nature, its property freedom still needs to be based on immutable laws of different kind (otherwise a free will would be an absurdity, causality implies if y necessary p). (Negative freedom-freedom from, positive freedom—freedom to. Autonomy=positive freedom, not affected by alien causes=negative freedom)

—Freedom of the will=autonomy, the property of will of being a law to itself.

—Freedom of the will (being a law to itself)=the categorical imperative (act on no other maxim then that which can also have as object itself as a universal law)

—If freedom of will is presupposed🡪morality and its principle follow from ‘freedom’ analytically. (However, the principle of morality is synthetical a priori. By analysing ‘an absolutely good will’ the property of the maxim cannot be discovered. Such synthetic proposition is possible only if: that the two cognitions are bound together by a third in which both are to be found. The positive concept of freedom (autonomy) provides this third cognition) (see end of paragraph)

—Freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings.

—P1: Since morality is a law for us only as rational beings, it needs to hold for all rational beings+ P2: Since morality can be derived only from the property of freedom🡪C: freedom must be proved as a property of all rational beings with a will.

—"Now, one cannot possibly think of a reason that would consciously receive direction from any other quarter with respect to its judgments, since the subject would then attribute the determination of his judgment not to his reason but to an impulse.” (rationality🡪freedom)

—How is a categorical imperative possible?

—The categorical imperative is a priori (about understanding). S’s will as reason obey the categorical (rational rules). S’s will is also empirical, affected by the senses, and here it appears as inclination.

— And so categorical imperatives are possible by this: that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world.

— But because *the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and so too of its laws* and is therefore immediately lawgiving with respect to my will.

—On the extreme boundary of practical philosophy.

—Freedom is an idea, not a concept of understanding. For practical purposes, reason is the only path to make use of our reason. The seeming contradiction between freedom and natural necessity needs to be solved—humans as appearances (are naturally determined) but humans as thing-in-itself are free.

**Fichte—The Doctrine of Science:**

Transcendental philosophy=conditions of possibility, deals with faculties of the mind which make objects possible.

Fichte is a Kantian (but he is different than Kant) and in this paper responds to skeptics which argue against the possibility of knowing the 12 categories. Fichte follows Reinhold plan of finding a secure foundation, starting from what everybody agrees on (but different than Reinhold’s consciousness: subject, object and representation). This foundation is the doctrine of science (science=not only physics, any domain of knowledge).

1. Philosophy is a science. However, people disagree with the object of science. This is so since science is not fully defined.
2. Science posses systematic form, but this is not the whole of it. Systematic form without knowable content leads to nowhere. Knowable content without systematic form is more scientific than form without content.
3. Science is a whole, it is formed of parts and it needs to be certain. The certainty of a part is transferred to the rest of the system, making it all certain. The whole needs a (certain) sound foundation, i.e. the first principles of that science (brings certainty and unity to the system)
4. These first principles cannot be proved inside that system, they need to be certain from the beginning. If the first principles are certain, everything derived from them is certain.
5. The inner content=the aspect of the first principles which is communicated to the rest. The form of science=the manner in which the inner content is transmitted to the rest.
6. Is science possible at all? To this question the science of science needs to answer. Philosophy, according to Fichte, is the science of science. If the scientific foundations of philosophy are proved, then philosophy will not be any more called simple amusement.
7. The doctrine of science has to do two things. 1. Establish the possibility of any first principle, to show under what conditions anything can be certain, (and what certain means), 2. Establish the first principles of all the sciences which are possible.
8. The doctrine of science is a science, it is based on a first principle which cannot be proved at all. This principle needs to be certain in itself, not certain for x reason.
9. The first principle of all knowledge cannot be proved that is the first principle. This principle needs to be shows by finding the proposition which 1. meets all the internal conditions 2.all the external conditions, if we are able to trace all that one knows back to it.
10. The doctrine of science is the form of a content, the content is the object of it. The object of the doctrine of science is the system of human knowledge.
11. The system of human knowledge exists independently from the doctrine of science (The object exists independently from the science of it). The doctrine of science puts the system of human knowledge in a systematic form. How is this science distinguished from its object?
12. This object which exists independently from the science of it is “the acts of the mind”. These acts contain both content (what) and form (How they are ordered according to laws). The form is the specific ways of each act. The content and form of the object are present before the science of it.
13. It is not necessary that we observe the acts in an unmixed way. What are in fact more elements can be seen just as one by un less skilled observer. The temporal order we observe them might not correspond to their logical order.
14. The ‘acts of the mind’ are the object of the Doctrine of science, for forming the doctrine of science awareness of mind’s mode of acting is needed. The object functions according to necessary laws. The act of reflection is a free act.
15. Through ‘free act’ an already existent form becomes a new content (content of knowledge or consciousness)—act of reflection. The new content is put in a pure, unmixed form (abstraction)=similar to Kantian freedom but applied to epistemology.
16. How does the philosopher through reflection (free acting) know how to separate the essence from accidental elements of an act? (What rules guide freedom in this act of separation?) Through experiment, there is no method. Through error people discover the principle. Reflection is free—S decides if reflection is done or not, however, reflection when performed follows precise laws. Since there are rules for reflection, it needs to be assumed that finding the principle of Doctrine of science is possible.
17. Suppose that the highest concept is the I, non-I can be placed in opposition to the I unless it is posited (within the highest thing we can conceive of) within the I. I considered as: a) as that in which the non-I is posited b) that which is posited in opposition to the non-I. Both I and non-I are equivalent since they are posited inside the absolute I (The I opposes the non-I). The element inside the I (In the absolute I) which makes the equivalence between I and non-I possible is **quantity**. Both I and non-I have a quantity which is determined through opposition to each other.
18. The first aspect is that the I is determined by the non-I=the I is dependent and is named intellect (which represents stuff given through the senses). First part—Theoretical.
19. The second aspect: the non-I is determined by the I (This second I is not **the representing I** but an I which possess absolute causality). This causality contradicts representation, it is a causality which is not a causality=striving. (This causality is conceivable as an approximation to infinity which is inconceivable. Second part—Practical. The second part is the foundation for the first part. It explains why there needs to be representations (which are caused by non-I) at all?
20. The three absolutes—the first principles of the Doctrine of science

* The absolute I which gives the law to itself which can be represented only under an affection from the non-I.
* The absolute non-I which is free, independent from our laws but which can be represented only as expressing these laws.
* **An absolute capacity to determine ourselves absolutely** according to the effect of both the I and the non-I. (this capacity can be represented only insofar as it distinguishes an effect of the non-I from one of the I and from a law).

1. Self-positing of the I: A=A, I=I, I am I, I (Subject) posit myself (object).

**Hegel—Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy.**

About the philosophising with the history of philosophy

—The history of philosophy needs to represent (in general) the people responsible for its development.

—The history of philosophy itself: a) the relation between philosophy and its historical setting. b) what is proper to philosophy itself.

— Spirit evolves through different forms, through the development of state and society. One of the forms of the spirit is philosophy. Philosophy is the concept, the final result of the development of philosophy.

—People start to philosophies when: a) the necessity of life are met (philosophy is a free, not a self-seeking activity) + b) people are not interested in individual interest (are not passionate about themselves). When society is in crisis, when people cannot be satisfied with their living existence they turn to thought. (e.g. Plato, Roman philosophy, modern philosophy)

—It is not simply that people philosophies in general when a) and b), but that a ***specific* *philosophy*** appears based on the ***specific characteristic*** which permeates every other aspect of people’s lives.

—Thus, political history is not the cause of philosophy. The spirit is manifested in different forms. Even if it seems to be many accidental elements, all form one spirit. For showing the spirit of age, the philosophy of history needs to be done.

Philosophy and science

— History of philosophy is related with he history of also other subject matter, such as art and religion.

—Knowledge and thinking is the basis also of the particular sciences. Philosophy, unlike particular sciences, is not concerned with appearances.

—When the science becomes systematic, it is related to a limited set of subject matters.

—The source of these sciences can be:

1.the external world

2.emotion and feeling

3.a natural sense of right or duty

Each age has its characteristic forms of thought

— The forms of thought are characteristic to a certain culture and age. These forms of thought are the basis of our aims and ideas. These forms of thought are unknown to us, we use them but do not reflect on them. Par example, being, one uses the concept of being but is not actively thinking about it.

Philosophy, art and religion:

— Men look in religion for views on the essence of the world, spirit and man’sn relation with the essence.

—This essence is an object in consciousness, an ‘other’ (which is different than them).

—Through worship man replaces the opposition between him and the essence and unites with it.

—This essence is absolute reason. This essence is the idea of infinite rationality.

—The idea that religion is done to deceive people is stupid. Religion is the study of the absolute essence, which is beyond material, finite concerns.

—Religion and art are a primitive way to represent the absolute, because S is not developed enough to use abstract thinking.

Philosophies are forms of the one:

—philosophies are different from each other, but we can see the one in all of them.

—there is an advancement in their principles such that the following is only a further determination of the predecessor (only in this that the difference consists)

—The principles also emerge in opposition to each other: stoicism and epicureanism. Stoicism is about thinking, the universal. Epicureanism is about feeling, the particular. It is only both together which constitute the entire concept, man is both thinking and feeling. In skepticism the negative emerges and cancels the one-sidedness of each of them (Stoicism and Epicureanism). Skepticism thinks that it has destroyed them but this is not the case, since both are necessary.

— The idea is that elements from an early stage in the history of philosophy is preserved and in relation with future elements forms a whole.

Our Concern is not with History proper but with the History of Thought

—is not just with the past, but with the ideas from the past which are part our spirit of our present. Is not about just knowing historical facts, but to know to reflect about one’s identity.

**Hegel—Phenomenology of Spirit:**

1. Before understanding x, the cognition of x, one should understand cognition itself. Cognition is the instrument by which one has an hold on the absolute.
2. There are various types of cognition, some better suited for different purposes. If cognition is a faculty with a determinate scope, then without a determination of its limits, one ends up not knowing.
3. The concern that there cannot be cognition of what is in itself, of the absolute. If cognition is an instrument, it modifies the absolute. If it is just a medium, we obtain an image of the absolute as seen in this medium. It seems that cognition brings the opposite of what is meant to do. This problem can be partially solved through cognition of the instrument/medium itself. In this way what is added by the instrument is subtracted and the absolute is purely. This improvement changes nothing—since it would live the absolute as empty as before inquiry. (subtracting the sense and reason which are instruments would lead one to contemplate nothing)
4. Our scepticism of the possibility of knowing the absolute is based on presupposition. It presupposes that cognition is an instrument or a medium. It presupposes that cognition is separate from the absolute. If it is outside the absolute, it is outside the truthful. It is possible to reject that the absolute alone is true through stating that a cognition which does not have access to the absolute can still know other truth. Instead of already presupposing that the absolute is separate from cognition, and that there is absolute truth separate from other truth. **One should provide an answer to what the absolute, cognition and subjective is**, instead of already presupposing. Science needs to get rid of a superficial, appearance, understanding of it. (The distinction between representation and thing-in-itself is obscure)
5. Apparent knowledge=information as it appears to us, it gets refined along its way to absolute knowing. Natural consciousness=the consciousness which develops itself through different stages of apparent knowledge until it obtains absolute knowledge.
6. Scepticism is not only negation—it is necessary in philosophy. The goal is to unity concept with object—absolute knowing.
7. Knowledge is based on self-criticism, the criterion of it is consciousness. Truth, essence is about an objective reality and present in consciousness (🡪thus conspicuousness is the criterion). The essence adapts itself to consciousness, we get closer to the truth.
8. One is not aware until the end that each part in history is part of the masterplan of consciousness.

Long version:

[**73.**](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm#m073) It is a natural idea that before engaging in philosophical inquiry one should first examine the instrument or medium of such knowledge (Locke, Kant). Perhaps it is a good or a bad instrument, perhaps no good at all for knowledge of what absolutely is, since it modifies or distorts its object. It is quite vain, however, to try to eliminate the refracting and transforming powers of the instrument and so arrive at the intrinsic notion of the thing. For if what absolutely is cannot be reached by our faculty of knowledge, with all its refracting and transforming power, there is no sense in supposing that it can be reached by dispensing with or discounting the work of this faculty and the course it has to take. Remove the way truth affects us and nothing at all remains.

**[74.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m074)** But if we doubt the ability of knowledge to reach what absolutely is, why not doubt the doubt and so on? It may be pointed out, further, that the notion of knowledge as a medium or instrument which stands in an external relation to what absolutely is, which is quite separate from it, is a wholly questionable notion which makes knowledge impossible from the start. In our fear of error we are excluding the possibility of knowledge.

**[75.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m075)** That we might have knowledge of a sort, e.g. of phenomena, but not of what absolutely is, is a wholly obscure notion to which no one has managed to give any clear meaning. (Even knowledge of*Schein or Erscheinung,*Hegel is later to insist, is knowledge- of how things really appear to be or manifestly are.)

**[76.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m076)** All these confused conceptions which make knowledge inherently impossible must be dismissed: the actual development of knowledge itself sets them aside. But knowledge in its first appearance is itself merely apparent and so defective. Science cannot merely claim to be better than such apparent knowledge, for this is to put itself on the level of the latter, and to rely on its mere existence. Nor can it appeal to its own rudimentary presence in apparent knowledge, for this is not, in apparent knowledge, specially distinctive. We must accordingly say what apparent knowledge really is.

**[77.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m077)** Apparent knowledge in all its varied forms is the path taken by the natural consciousness till it reaches true knowledge. Along this path **Soul** becomes purified into **Spirit**: by a complete experience of itself it comes to know what it in itself is.

**[78.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m078)** In philosophy fundamental beliefs are always being shaken and are not restored in the same form as in the case of ordinary doubt. We are not merely trained thinkers who are now trying to think for themselves: we are people who for the first time are really learning how to think, for whom the results of all training are in question. Philosophical skepticism is radical and not piecemeal.

**[79.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m079)** But in philosophy scepticism does not merely doubt: it always arrives at a determinate positive result, a position whose positive truth involves, and is involved by, the negation of the position just considered before. Purely negative scepticism is a delusive form of consciousness which is passed on the way.

**[80.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m080)** The goal of knowledge is a situation where there is no longer an apparent element to be discounted and transcended, but where Notion and object are mutually adequate. Consciousness by its very nature presses on to this goal, though it sometimes retreats in terror from this endless self-transcendence, and affects to regard all positions of thought as vain and empty, or as good in their own kind, thereby increasing its own vain self-importance.

**[81.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m081)** To progress in self-criticism it seems that there must be a criterion which knowledge can apply to itself. But knowledge does not seem to possess any such criterion wherewith it can test itself.

**[82.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m082)** Knowledge is always given as correlated with an independent, self- existent, objective something, *the truth.*This truth may be for consciousness, but it also is what it is in itself.

**[83.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m083)** This independent, self-existent truth must, however, itself be a truth for consciousness, and this seems to make consciousness its own criterion, and to point to *another*self-existent truth with which the first truth can be compared, and so on.

**[84.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m084)** In reality, however, both the self-existent truth and the knowledge of it fall within consciousness. Or otherwise put, the object as it intrinsically is, its essence, on the one hand, and the object *as* an object for consciousness or a Notion, on the other, both fall within consciousness, and the latter has to be made to conform to the former. Or if we identify Notion and essence, and the object is what this is for us, then we have to see if the object conforms to the Notion. Both these processes are the same and in them consciousness only applies its own criterion to itself. (This paragraph seems pure subjective idealism — consciousness in testing its ideas, its immanent contents, merely confronts them with other ideas, other immanent contents. But it call also be interpreted as saying that what objects ‘in themselves’ are is always more or less adequately there in and for consciousness, and in knowledge it has merely to replace an inadequate by a more adequate revelation.)

**[85.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m085)** Consciousness itself tests itself and compares itself with its own object: we, the philosophical observers, call only observe it at work. Consciousness itself constantly changes its view of the object. The object was intrinsically [*an sich*] becomes merely what it is to consciousness, and a new *An sich*develops. We may say that consciousness is adjusting itself to the reality of being, but it is more correct to say that the reality of being is adjusting itself to consciousness. In this adjustment the criterion applied by consciousness is *itself*being tested and transformed.

**[86.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m086)** For consciousness to negate what at first seemed absolutely objective, and for it to regard this absolute truth as a mere truth for-consciousness, is for consciousness to have lived through an experience [*Erfahrung*] in the phenomenological sense, which always involves self-transcendence.

**[87.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m087)** The progress of consciousness can be progress for consciousness; it can also be a progress for the phenomenological observer who is considering and commenting on consciousness. The phenomenological observer sees the links of negation and the resultant positiveness which springs from negation in the successive phases of consciousness, whereas for consciousness itself each step involves a surprising transition to a totally new object. The deep dialectic seen by the phenomenological observer goes on behind the back of consciousness itself.

**[88.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m088)** Science includes in its content the road to Science, the account of its own essential experience.

**[89.](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm" \l "m089)** The shapes of consciousness are not fully conscious of themselves as shapes of consciousness, nor of their place in a continuous conscious history, until the end of the road is reached.

A picture containing furniture, curtain

Description automatically generated

**Engels—Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy°**

Part I—Hegel:

—The revolution of Hegelian dialectics in philosophy

—For Hegel truth is the process of cognition itself (dialectics), is no longer an absolute state of knowing. The dialectics constantly *endlessly* (all stages are transitory, not permanent) moves from inferior to superior stages—**conservatory aspect**: each stage was justified by the conditions which lead to it (and loses this justification when it changes**). revolutionary aspect**: each stage is replaced with a better one.

—Hegel as not fully promoting the revolution of the dialectic (still building a system).

—The endless dialectics view is not expressed by Hegel; it just results from Hegel’s method. Hegel stated that the dialectics has an end, the absolute idea, since Hegel wanted to make a philosophical system.

—In *Logic* Hegel states that eternal truth is just the historical process, but Hegel supplies this process with an end. Also, Hegel could make this end a beginning again by alienating—the absolute truth transforms itself into nature and comes to itself again in mind.

—At the end of philosophy, a similar return to the beginning is possible. Some believe that philosophy reached its end during Hegel and thus the perfect political system is the Prussian state monarchy based on social estates.

—Hegel’s system covers an incomparably greater domain than any earlier system:

—*The Phenomenology of Mind*—(the development of individual consciousness through its different stages) includes many topics: logic, natural philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of history, philosophy of right, philosophy of religion, philosophy of aesthetic

—In a philosophical doctrine, the system is perishable since it results from the need for absolute answers. Philosophers renounce at reaching by themselves the absolute truth and search for relative truths.

Part 4—Marx

—The project of materialistic philosophy

—The followers of Hegel: Straus, Bauer, Stimer, Feuerbach, Marx. Out of them, only Marx did something truly valuable. (Feuerbach had some significance but disposed Hegel as useless, without arguments)

—Marx reversed Hegel, Marx was a materialistic, looked at nature and history without idealistic preconceptions. Eliminate idealistic conceptions: facts conceived not as fantastically interconnected. Materialism was taken seriously by Marx and carried in all fields of knowledge.

—Hegel was not simply put aside—Marx used the revolutionary side of the dialectical method.

—According to Hegel dialectic is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept is not only eternal, is the actual living soul of the whole world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages.

—Absolute develops itself🡪“alienates” and becomes nature🡪develops itself and returns to itself in man’s self-awareness🡪it develops itself from the crude form until achieving maturity in Hegelian philosophy.

—replace dialectics of ideas with that of things—of the laws of motion of man (conscious) and nature (unconscious).

Marxist philosophy eliminates idealist concepts.

—Materialist view sees ideas as images of real things instead of real things as images of ideas.

—The world is not to be thought as readymade things, but as a complex process, in which things and ideas constantly change.

—in spite of all retrogression there is a progressive development.

The dialectical thinking shows that one cannot think in absolute opposite: the good has a bad side which will be discarded, the bad has a good side which permitted it to be believed in the past.

—The old metaphysics: world as made out of things. New metaphysics: the world is made of processes. The old metaphysics had its purpose, before thinking of processes one has to think of things.

–The sciences of this century deal with processes: e.g. geology, physiology, embryology.

—The history development of society is different than that of nature.

In nature—unconscious agencies acting on each other which result in general laws. Nothing of these happen as a desired aim.

In society—all actors are conscious, working towards definite goals. Even so man follow inner general laws.

—The intentions of individual people are not always fulfilled. Through the interaction a certain given result appears. This result seems accidental but functions according to given laws.

—Make their own history, is the question of what each man desires—passion or deliberation.

—What motivates one’s passion are of different nature: external objects, ideal motives, ambitions, personal hatred, individual whims.

—In relation to the total result one’s aim are of secondary importance.

—What are the historical forces which transform into these motives in the actors?

—The old materialism considers that history tells us that vicious people win. The old materialism does not study the laws behind the drives of people.

—Hegel recognizes that there need to be forces behind the drives of peoples. Hegel imports these forces from ideal philosophy.

—E.g. Hegel states that history in ancient Greece come out of the “forms of beautiful individuality”.

—This force (behind the drives of people) are not about single individuals or great mobs of people which do not lead to lasting change. Are about the historical forces which lead to lasting change.

—What motivates people comes out of their mind, but what comes in mind is determined by the circumstances

—E.g. the workers have not become reconciled with capitalist industry even if they do not destroy the machines anymore.

—Establishing the driving forces of history

—In the past the driving causes of history was very difficult due to the complicated interconnections between the driving forces and their effects.

—Since the establishment of large-scale industry, it has been clear that there are three classes competing in history:

1.aristocrats

2.bourgeoisie (middle class)

3.workers.

—in 1830 the working class has been recognized as a third competitor for power.

—Historians speak about the conflict between 1. and 2.

—The struggle between bourgeoisie and workers

(There is a political aspect in aristocracy, taking land by force. The struggle between aristocracy and bourgeoisie is based on economic interest)

—The bourgeoisie and the proletariat are not forced based on political factors but economical.

—Bourgeoisie and proletariat appeared out of new economic conditions—new mode of production

—The economic transition makes the conflict between working class and the bourgeoisie possible: the transition from handcrafted manufacturing to large scale industry.

Mode of production=productive forces+relations of production.

Order of production=productive forces+relations of exchange.

The bourgeoise order of production🡪overthrows the feudal order of production.

However, the new order of production, due to limits of capital production,🡪great polarization and unsellable products (overproduction and misery cause each other).

Thus, the proletariat must liberate the productive forces by changing the mode of production.

—Each class struggle is a political struggle but this political struggle is based on an economic question of emancipation.

—The supremacy of a class or another is determined by the order of production.

The state is determined by changes in civil society

—The economic rules of civil society—not the state, is the decisive element (Hegel considers the reverse)

—As the forces motivated by a person need to pass through his brain and become motives of the will, so the needs of civil society need to pass through the will of the state—this is the formal aspect of the matter.

—What is the content of this formal will?

—When this is inquired it is seen that in modern history the will of the state is determined by changes in civil society.

Germany and theorizing.

—In time of political humiliation Germany was good at theorizing—Germany lost that quality and become good at practice, starting to manufacture on large-scale. In this way the bureaucratic management of feudalism was abolished.

—In Historical sciences and philosophy, the zeal for theory disappeared completely. The official representatives of these sciences have become the ideologists of the existing state against the working class

Understanding society means understanding labor

—In the working class the aptitude for theorizing remains uninfluenced by political factors.

—To understand the history of society one needs to understand labor—“the more ruthlessly and disinterestedly science proceeds the more it finds itself in harmony with the interest and aspirations of the workers”.

Karl Marx—Letter to Ruge

Marx moving out of Germany, bad environment

In Germany there is anarchy, lack of spirit, it is not a space for independent thinking.

—Marx is going to Paris.

—Marx wants to open a new political journal with Ruge.

Marx’s vocation

—Marx need to expose his philosophy is a real need (of the world). The internal obstacle of ‘where to’ is greater than the external obstacles.

—there is no precise idea of what ought to happen.

—the new movement tries not to anticipate the world with one’s dogma but to criticize the past.

A new better communism, not dogmatic.

—Philosophy is now secularized, this is so because philosophy has joined the battle (ruthlessly criticizing the existing order)

—Dogmatic ideas should be clarified

—communism is a dogmatic abstraction, as it is in the teachings of Cabet, Dezamy and Weitling.

—This communism is only partially manifesting the humanistic principle, it is infected by private property.

—Fourier and Proudhon criticism the one-sidedness of ‘communism’.

—The whole of socialism is one-sided dealing with the reality of men.

—Marx want to deal with the theoretical side of man: religion and science.

Marx wants to influence German contemporaries. Religion and politics are very important for contemporaries.

—The critic can look the theoretical and practical consciousness and find the goal implicit in the actual reality, from this goal he can deduce a true reality.

—The political state contains the postulates of reason in its modern forms.

(what does it mean that reason has been realized?)

Knowing politics and religion

—reason is in a conflict between its ideal vocation and its actually existing premises.

Knowing the political state enables us to infer the social truth.

Religion enable one to infer the theoretical struggles of man.

—the nature of the political state contains all social struggles, needs and truths.

—Politics should make even the most specialized political problem an object of its criticism.

—A great party will be interested in practice if the superiority of representative system over Estate system is proved. By proving the importance of the representative system will make the party transcend itself.

—We need to be engaged in criticism of politics—to make people aware of their mission

—We will not try to show that the old struggles are useless and proclaim the new world order. We will develop new principles from already existing principles—make people aware of their struggle.

We need to make people aware of their consciousness—of its actions. The aim of Marx is to make people aware of politcal and religios problems.

—our task is not to divide the future from the past but to complete the past. It will not be a new work, but completeness of the old work.

Karl Marx—Thesis on Feuerbach (theoretical/practical attitude, action, conceiving essence of humanity, conceiving religion: practical—Marx vs theoretical— Feuerbach. Discarding theoretical materials which focused on civil society instead of social humanity.)

1. object conceived as contemplation, not as practice
2. activity was discussed abstractly by idealistic and Feuerbach.
3. In Essence of Christianity Feuerbach considers contemplation the only genuine attitude.
4. Human essence discussed too abstractly, contemplating, instead of focusing on practice, on changing the world.
5. The power of objective truth needs to be proved in practice, not theory.
6. The materialistic doctrine that man are the results of circumstances forgets a) the educators need to be educated, b) man changes circumstances. (divides society in two parts, one above society)
7. The fact that secular creates a religious world can be explained by the inner conflicts of the secular. The secular needs to be revolutionised.
8. The human essence is not abstract but determined by social relations. (Essence can be thought only as generality, separated from historical context)
9. The highest point of contemplative materialism is single individuals and civil society.
10. New materialism: humans society.

**Longer Version**

The problem with Feuerbach, too theoretical

—The main defect of materialism—including that of Feuerbach— is that the object is conceived as contemplation but not as practice.

—The study of activity was done in an abstractly fashion by idealism.

—Feuerbach differentiates between objects and thought-objects, but does not conceive of human activity as objective. In Essence of Christianity regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuine human attitude.

—Marx criticizes Feuerbach for discussing about the human in abstract terms, as an idea to be contemplated, instead of focusing on the practical aspect of human action—philosophers need to change the world instead of just thinking about it.

—If objective truth is part of human thinking is a practical question—man must prove the power of truth in practice. Thinking without being directed to practice is useless.

The materialistic doctrine that man are the result of circumstances forgets the fact that men are the ones changing circumstances.

—Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society—a) they think that historical factors control man b)forget that educators need also to be educated.

—revolutionary practice= changing circumstances+ self-change.

Feuerbach states that religion duplicates the world into a religious (imaginary world) and a secular one.

—Feuerbach reduces the religious world to the secular.

—The fact that the secular basis creates a religious world can be explained by the inner conflicts and contradiction of the secular world.

—the secular world must be solved of its contradictions, revolutionized.

Feuerbach not satisfied with abstract thinking want to contemplate about physical stuff but does not study practical activity.

—F reduces the religious to the human essence. The human essence is not an abstract idea in about each individual but is determined by social relations.

—1. Studies the religious sentiment as an abstraction, separated from historical context

2.the essence for F can be thought only as a generality.

F does not see the religious sentiment as a social product, as depending on concrete relations. (sees as an abstract idea in itself)

—All mysteries which make the mind become religious can be resolved through practice (changing one’s social position).

—The highest point reached by contemplative materialism is the contemplation of single individuals and civil society.

—The new type of materialism should address not only civil society, but society as a whole.

—Civil society—obedient.

human society—active, changing themselves.

**Seminar Discussion:**

Marx criticizes materialism (old materialism) and enforces a new materialism. Old materialism—not enough materialism New materialism—focus on human activity, practice.

———————————-

Marx criticzed also idealism—Hegel, Kant.

—the focus on the theoretical side.

—focus only on thought.

—the problem with idealism is that sensibility for them is passive (unimportant).

(1.Sens-> passive

2.Under-> active

3.reason->active —Kant)

———————————

Dirty-Jewish of appearance—when doing something practical, one needs to get his hands dirty. The practical has secondary importance, one needs to meddle with it just out of necessity.

Feuerbach considers the theoretical attitude as the only genuine human attitude, he does not consider practice, thus he disregards: —revolution—changing the world, communism, critical thinking

**Kierkegaard—Fear and trembling**

Kierkegaard’s writing has nothing to do with the system, with a rational explanation for everything, what he does has to do with faith.

Attunement:

—The story of Abraham is unique, difficult to understand. (It seems easy but is not) He has the wish to see Abraham, to witness the events. (To live the experience of it)

— The Philosophers talk abstractly, they can talk with ease about Abraham because they make the situation Abstract and substitute Isaac with the best. In a sens sacrificing the best for God means sacrificing the best. This is an abstraction because it leaves out that anguish.

The ethical vs the religious

—From an ethical point of view, what Abraham did was the intention to murder his son. Religiously, he was sacrificing him.

—without the aspect of faith, killing Isaac remains an act easy to imitate. Also, even if one out of faith wants to murder his son to imitate Abraham, one is unethical. (God needs to command this to be acceptable. Also, is what God commands always in line with he ethical, or are the two different)

—Abraham’s life is a paradox. Kant criticizes philosophers that they consider faith simple to understand. (Hegel considers religion as an inferior stage in the spirit’s progression towards knowledge, philosophy is the highest stage) Hegel is easy to understand in comparison with Abraham.

The ethical is the universal, it applies to everyone at each moment.

—It has nothing outside itself as the telos, it is the telos of everything else.

—The task of the single individual is to deny his particularity and act as the universal.

—When the single individual expresses his particularity, he is against the universal and thus sins.

—If the idea of the universal is all that there is to human existence, then the ethical and one own’s telos are one and the same—>to suspend the telos teleological would be a contradiction. By suspending the ethical one is against (eliminate) his telos. Yet, the teleological suspension of the ethical would seem to imply that it preserves the telos in a higher place.

—If Hegel is right, then Abraham should be condemned as a murderer.

Faith is this paradox: the single individual is higher than the universal.

—The single individual was in the universal, no sets himself as the particular above the universal.

—Faith is this paradox: the single invidual (particular) is superior to the universal.

—Now the single individual by means of the universal becomes the particular which stands in an absolute relation to the absolute.

—this relation to the absolute cannot be mediated (transformed into a higher hegelian conceptual unity) because mediation works only though the universal.

—Faith finds its proper expression in S who’s life is so paradoxical that it cannot be though. Faith means acting based on the strength of the absurd (it is absurd that the single universal to be higher than the universal).

The difference between Abraham and the tragic hero

—Abraham is not a tragic here, he is a murder or a man of faith. Tragic here, sacrificing his son/daughter for a higher good of society. (this falls under the universal as a telos).

—Abraham has overstepped the ethical, has an higher telos outside it

Abraham against the universal (the angry gods personal case)

–Abraham is in no way connected to the universal. He did not do for the higher good of a collective. (If he did for pleasing angry gods, the gods would be angry only at him, thus it is a private matter)

—Abraham’s life is a matter of personal virtue

—The moment one speaks one expresses the universal. Abraham is not in relaiton to the universal, Abraham cannot speak about his case. (Expressed in relation to the universal, what Abraham does is sin)

Schopenhauer—The World as Will and representation

The world is just my representation

—“The world is my representation”—a priori intuition which is the bases of other a priori intuitions like time, space, causality. This is the intuition that the perception of world is divided in subject and object.

—genus—“this are my representation”

—species—time, space, causality

—time, space and causality are about something (are about an object, pertain to a subject which perceives through them).

—There is no more certain proof that this: that in case of knowledge, of what means world to us, there is just object in relation to subject.

—The world exists only for the subject, is representation.

—Kant denies this most obvious truth—that the world is just representation, he speaks about the noumena.

—Descartes doubts about it. Berkeley enunciated it.

—Vedanta early recognized this truth, that the world has no essence separately form mental perception.

—for Vedanta there is no essence separate from perception, against Kant that there are things in themselves.

The world as both will and representation

—This world is both will and representation but it cannot be Kant’s noumena.

—it is either just representation, as we perceive it, or either

The subject knows all things yet is unknowable.

—whatever exists, exists only for the subject, it is the universal condition for all things.

The world as representation has two aspects (subject and object):

—the body is an object, a representation.

—the body exists in time and space where is plurality.

—the subject, knower, is not in space and time and thus is neither plurality nor unity.

1.the object, the forms of it are space and time—plurality.

2.the subject is not in space and time, it is whole and undivided.

—It is sufficient that for one person representation disappears for the world to disappear.

—the two halves, object and subject are interdependent. They limit each other, where the object begins, the subject ends.

—the universal forms of each object (space and time, causality) can be fully knowns by the subject even without knowledge of the object—they are a priori.

Schopenhauer sustains that what is at the basis of all that is a priori is the principle of sufficient reason.

—Each object is subordinated to the principle of sufficient reasons, it stands in a necessary relation to other objects.

—Each object can be determined by x or determining x—principle of sufficient reason.

—this necessary relation (between objects) appears in other forms corresponding to the classes into which objects are divided.

Second book

The full meaning of world as my representation cannot be found if the investigator itself is only the knowing subject.

—the investigator is rooted in this world.

—his knowledge, the basis of the whole world of representation, is given entirely through the medium of the body.

The body as an objectification of the will

—For the purely knowing subject the body is a representation is any other, functioning according to laws—as it is given as a representation.

The body is also given as will, and this explains the inner mechanism, desires of the being.

—One cannot actually will an act without being a movement of the body.

—the act of will and the act of the body are not two different acts causally connected, they are the same act.

—The action of the body is nothing, but the act of the will put in the form of representation.

(—This also applies to involuntary stimuli)

—The body is nothing but objectified will.

—Will is knowledge a priori of the body and the body is knowledge posteriori of the will.

—Every person represents its own body different than any other representation.

—this different manner is denoted by will.

—We have double knowledge of the body. Besides knowledge of it as any representation, we have knowledge of what is in itself—it’s motives and sufferings.

Analogy, from the body as my will to all other objects with their wills.

The inner being of every phenomenon is analyzable in terms of representation and will. Each object has its own will, even if it is not perceived by us.

Everywhere in nature there is struggle and fluctuation of victory—this aspects are essential to the will.

—Every grade of the will’s objectifications fight for the matter, space and time of another.

—matter constantly needs to change form since due to causality,

—each form strives to appear, to impose its idea.

—this variance of the will is seen in the animal kingdom.

—the idea of an animal can exist by elimination of the idea of another.

—this conflict of the will is manifested in humans as homo homini lupus.

Men is subordinate to the will.

Knowledge—rational knowledge and knowledge from perception—proceed from the will itself.

—belongs to the inner being of the will as a mere mechanism to preserve the individual, like any organ of the body.

Third book

Two inseparable constituent parts of aesthetic consideration:

—knowledge of the object as Platonic Idea (not thing)

—knowledge as self-consciousness of the knower, as pure will-less subject of knowledge.

—The condition which permits that the two parts to be unites is the abandonment of the method of knowledge which is bound to the principle of sufficient reason.

—the pleasure produced by contemplation of the beautiful arise from those two parts, more from one than the other depending on the object of aesthetic contemplation.

Willing comes out of lack and thus out of suffering.

—Fulfilment brings this to an end. Yet, one thing is satisfied yet many others are not. We always desire new things.

—No satisfaction of the will can give a satisfaction which lasts forever.

—As long as we are subordinated to the will, with its hopes and fears, we never obtain lasting peace.

—Is the same wether we pursue or flee (aspire enjoyment or fear harm), we are based on the will and unhappy.

When internal disposition or external causes make our attention not be focused on the will, one starts to comprehend things freely—see things objectively (we view things as simple representations)

The state above described is that of contemplation, absorbed in percetion, being lost in the object—not following the principle of sufficent reason

—forgetting individuality.

—In this state:

the perceived individual thing is raised to the Idea of its specieas

+the knowig individul to the pure subject of will-less knwoeldge (the two no long stand in the stream of time and other relations).

Fourth book

—Egoism and objectification of the will (is the starting point of all conflict).

—Objectification of the will in nature leads to struggle, conflict between different wills.

—Time and space—principium individuationis—through them the plurality is possible.

—they are the essential forms of natural knowledge, knowledge that springs from the will.

—The will everywhere manifests itself in the plurality of individuals. This plurality is about will in representation, not will in-itself.

—The will in-itself is whole and undivided and perceives the many repeated images of its own inner being.

—this inner nature itself is found in the inner self.

The individual is the bearer of the knowing subject, and this knowing subject is the bearer of the world.

—the world, and all remaining individuals exist for oneself just as representations, which are dependent on one’s inner being.

The problem of egoism

Every individual is both as the will-to-life, the in itself of the world, and as representation.

—Each individual considers himself the center of the world, would be willing to sacrifice all others for one’s good—this is egoism.

—the will is in conflict with itself as it is manifested in different people.

—due to principium individutionis the will manifests equally in different individuals.

Because from the standpoint of an individual only him is will and all others are representation of his will—one positions oneself as the most important thing.

—In humans egoism has reached the highest degree. Look at the history full of wars, tyrants. This is most visible when there are no laws—see Hobbes “bellum omnium contra omnes”

Egoism=seeing everything else just as representation. The problem with this is that one does not sees others also as will.

—Even if principium individuationims, the will is against other wills, justice and goodness arise, one is able to sacrifice itself for the good of others, having pure disinterested affection—e.g. Socrates, Giordano Bruna.

Suffering as an integral part of human life and sympathy:

—through the satisfaction of desire a pain is resolved, but not positive happiness brought.

—what motives people to be good is the knowledge of the suffering of others, intelligible from one’s suffering (sympathy and compassion).

—sympathy is the way to get out of the will, sympathy is an emotion.

—The paradox—even if there is no reason for loving another more than oneself people do it.

—S disagrees with kant which states that morality stems from abstract reflection.

—selfishness–eros

—compassion-agape.

—the two are often combined, e.g. friendship.

The solution to the problem of egoism—ascetism

—From sympathy, which goodness, affection and virtue arise, also the denial of the will-to-life appears.

—Everywhere is impermanace and suffering, one seeing behind the principium individuationims (the vail of maya) one identified as the whole of nature and the sufferings of others become suffering of one’s own.

—The man which sees through the principium individuationis is able to see things-in-themseves, and to identify oneself with the whole.

—man rejects his inner nature as will. This is the transition from virtue to ascetism—it is not enought to love others as oneself, one rejects attachements to anything.

1. against egosim through sympathy—>one does not identify with its own indiviudliaty

2. one identifying with all realizes that the will is bad and renounced of his own nature.

P.S.

—Schopenhauer does not view nature as teleologically ordered, but just as a conflict of the will.

Frederic Nietzsche—On the Genealogy of Morals. A Polemic

**Preface:**

We do not have self-knowledge because we have not looked for ourselves.

—we are taken up by mundane activities and do not have time to spend it searching for ourselves.

Nietzsche (N) asks what is the origin of our terms good and bad—a skepticism to the classical account of morality.

—Under what conditions did man invent the value judgements good and evil? Did these values promote or not human flourishing?

N read The Origin of the Moral Sensations

which contains opinion opposite to his own.

—N published a paper about the origins of morality. In that paper he referred to passages from “The Origin of the Moral Sensations” to replace the improbable with the more probable.

More important than the origin of morality, N asks what is the value of morality.

—N is against his “teacher” Schopenhauer with his values of self-sacrifice.

—N sees in Schopenhauer’s philosophy a great danger to humanity, a temptation to nothingness. N understands the philosophy of compassion as a form of this danger.

—N states that philosophers were against compassion (before S)—Plato, Kant and Spinoza.

The problem of the value of compassion seems an isolated question but if one inquires carefully one sees that this problem has to do with the foundations of morality itself.

**First Essay: ‘Good and Evil’**

—Historians of morality

—they lack the historical spirit. This is seen when they discuss the origin of the concept of good:

—“non-egoistic acts were praised by the ones which benefited from them. Later, everyone forgot the origin of praising and due to habit people started to consider them good in themselves”.

—The English psychologist consider **usefulness, forgetting and habit** at the basis of our moral values.

For N, good is not about usefulness.

For N, the judgement that x is good does not come from whom goodness is shown, but by the people showing goodness—the powerful and noble consider their actions good—they create their values.

The antithesis between good and bad is based on how the noble characterize themselves in opposition to the normal people.

—the emotional basis of the moral judgments of the noble does not permit taking into account usefulness.

Slave morality:

—slave morality is produced out of resentment.

—resentment=hostility towards others, revenge.

—Noble morality is born out of self-affirmation.

—Salve morality is born out of denying what is outside of the slave’s interest.

—slave morality is based on reacting to external stimuli (resentment is a reaction)

About Slave Morality:

—It is normal for the weak to hate the strong.

—The strong do not hate the weak, they use the weak.

—It is absurd to ask strength to not express itself as what it is, as a desire to overthrow others, to rule over others. (as it is absurd to ask weakness to be strength)

—the slave morality holds the idea that the strong are free to be weak (thus the strong are responsible for hurting the weak)

—the weak people create their own model of what it means to be good, to not affirm yourself (no revenge) to not attack. (god does the revenge for you).

—the idea of soul is a lie created by the weak for feeling that their lives where a kind of accomplishment (the soul goes to heaven)

**Second essay: ‘Guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and related matters**

N’s theory of ‘bad conscience’:

—bad conscience is a serios illness.

The instinct man could not manifest outside were manifested inwardly—internalization of men—this is how man developed their soul.

When men moved from the free life of hunter to that of living in peacful society men were deprived of their instincts of freedom—these instincts started to act against man.

The man which manifested this instinct of was considered cruel—this is bad conscience.

(—men are violent because men want to manifest their instincts and recreat wilderness)

—men became sick and wanted to fight against the instincts of man.

Two assumptions in N’s theory of bad conscience:

1.the alteration from free animal to man in state was not gradual but a leap.

2.the shaping of a population, which was until that point unrestrained, was done by force.

—it is a fantasy that the state began through a contract.

—the rulers simply impose their will on the people

This rulers create a structure of domination, in which each part has its meaning.

The rulers do not have the idea of responsibility, consideration, the do not have ‘bad conscience’.

– this instinct of freedom forced back, repressed, incarcerated within itself and was finally able to discharge and unleash itself only against itself: that, and that alone, is bad conscience in its beginnings

—Solution, **the ubermensch** which says yes to life and is against nihilism, Christianity. Necessary a reverse of bad consciousness🡪instead of associating instinct with ‘bad consciousness’ S should associate idealism with ‘bad consciousness’. Idealism—negation of reality in name of ideas, a refusal to affirm oneself. Embracing instinct. Idealism is a form of masochism, of being against our very instinct searching for the absolute.